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INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL SCOPE
The fall of the Soviet Union allowed Ukraine to become inde-
pendent for the first time since its short lived independence during
World War 1.1 Within a few years of declaring its independence,
Ukraine adopted a new Constitution on June 28, 1996.2 Ukraine's new
Constitution has provisions which purport to protect the rights of a
Ukrainian citizen. These right-granting provisions, however, are al-
most uniformly subject to the adoption of future laws in the interest of
the rights and freedoms of others, and also the authority of the state to
protect public health, order, or welfare. 4 One key example is the indi-
vidual right to freedom of association in political parties and organiza-
tions.5 This right is limited by restrictions established by Ukrainian
law in the interest of national security, public order, public health, and
the rights and freedoms of others. 6 These rights-limiting provisions
which may be used to limit or remove previously granted rights under
the laws of the Ukraine are often termed "claw back" provisions.7 In
view of such "claw back" provisions, the main thrust of this Note is to
explore, and possibly predict, the future effectiveness of the citizens'
See OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 355-79 (1988) (discussing
Ukraine's post-World War I attempt to secure and maintain independence).
2 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA [Constitution] (1996) (Ukr.), translated in
Verkhovna Rada Internet Site (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://www.rada.kiev.ua/
const/conengl.html> [hereinafter UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA].
3 See id. at ch. II.
4 See id. at ch. II.
5 See id. at ch. II, art. 36.
6 See id. at ch. II, art. 37.
7 See Judge Bohdan A. Futey, Comments on the Constitution of Ukraine, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Spring-Summer 1996, at 29, 30.
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rights provisions within the Ukrainian Constitution. In particular, this
Note provides a guide for those who may argue for an expansive read-
ing of the rights provisions and a consequent narrow reading of the
claw back provisions before the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
To arrive at an authoritative interpretation of the claw back provi-
sions, one must determine what Ukrainian agency or court will inter-
pret the Constitution and what such body may use to accomplish this
task. Recent legislation in Ukraine gives the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine (Constitutional Court) sole jurisdiction to interpret the
Ukrainian Constitution (Constitution) and decide whether or not a law
in is, indeed, constitutional.8 The Constitutional Court may interpret
the Constitution using a number of factors. However, because the
Constitution is internally inconsistent, the Constitutional Court cannot
use the plain language of the Constitution.9 Instead, the Constitutional
Court may use Ukraine's history to divine what was intended when
the Constitution was written as well as what was intended to be
avoided. 10 Another possibility for interpreting the Constitution is us-
ing the political consensus which led to the Constitution's passage."
Additionally, conditions may also effect constitutional interpretation
in a social or public opinion context so as to facilitate the public good
economically or socially.12 The Constitutional Court may use all of
these factors as the U.S. Supreme Court does when interpreting the
American Constitution or may use some or none of these factors,
choosing instead the plain meaning of the Constitution. 1
3
8 See Judge Bohdan A. Futey, Comments on the Law on the Constitutional Court
of Ukraine, HARRIMAN REV., Spring 1997, at 15, 17.
9 Using the plain language is, in itself, an interpretive decision and is virtually
impossible due to the Constitution's contradictory language. If the plain language,
with no other factors, is used by the Constitutional Court, it would be intellectually
dishonest and a betrayal of the true import of the Constitution. See generally Futey,
supra note 7, at 29.
10 See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (using
American History to interpret the American Constitution).
1 See id. (using the political consensus which led up to the adoption of the Ameri-
can Constitution to interpret the American Constitution).
12 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that one does
have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution) with
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that one does not
have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution).
13 See Martin, 14 U.S. at 324-26. See generally Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (discussing
the fundamental right to contract); see also generally West Coast Hotel Co., 300
U.S. 379 (balancing the interests between employer and employee).
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In sum, this Note is meant to serve as a guide for those who wish
to assure that the rights granted in the Ukrainian Constitution are not
degraded. I hope to provide a basic framework that supports an expan-
sive interpretation of the Constitution's citizens rights provisions be-
fore the Constitutional Court. In Part I, I will discuss the historical
basis of both the citizens' rights provisions and the claw back provi-
sions. Part I will also show why the citizens' rights provisions were
included in the Constitution and what they were intended to prevent:
in short, why history mandates a broad interpretation of citizens'
rights while the claw back provisions allow only the most narrow en-
croachments on the rights granted. Part II will discuss the political
history of the inclusion of the citizens' rights provisions and claw
back provisions. The intent of those who drafted the Constitution and
the political compromises they made to gain passage of the Constitu-
tion will also be discussed. Part III will describe the function of the
Constitutional Court, its legislatively mandated procedures, and the
appeals process. It will also describe the various interpretive frame-
works which other national and supra-national courts have developed
to interpret similar provisions. In concluding, Part IV will first discuss
the economic threats to Ukrainian sovereignty and democratization in
Ukraine. Political threats to an unbiased interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, both external and internal, will also be evaluated. I will conclude
by advocating the interpretive method which the Constitutional Court
should embrace and discussing whether Ukraine will proceed on the
road to democracy or backtrack down the path to authoritarianism.
I. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE CITIZENS' RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND THE
CLAW BACK PROVISIONS 14
A court which interprets constitutional provisions may use the na-
tion's history and how this led up to the adoption of certain constitu-
tional provisions to determine what those constitutional provisions
were intended to allow or limit when adopted. 15 Commentators of
Ukraine law and history have advocated that the Constitutional Court
should use Ukraine's history to aid in its interpretation of the Consti-
tution due to the effect of history on the citizens' Constitutional rights
14 See generally, Jurij Borys, Political Parties in the Ukraine, in THE UKRAINE,
1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 128 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977).
15 See, e.g., Martin, 14 U.S. at 324-26; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
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provisions and the apparent intent of the Constitution to prevent future
governmental excesses such as occurred under Soviet Rule.
16
In the 201h century, Ukraine's history reveals an intent to follow
"Western" values and ideology.17 Prior to the 1990s, Ukraine was in-
dependent only during one other period this century, namely in the
closing days of World War J.18 The path that the Ukraine chose at that
16 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 29; ALEXANDER J. MOTYL, DILEMMAS OF
INDEPENDENCE: UKRAINE AFTER TOTALITARIANISM (1993) (examining Ukraine's
troublesome Soviet past and suggesting ways in which it can be overcome); SUB-
TELNY, supra note 1.
17 See Roman Szporluk, Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,
126 DAEDALUS 85, 85-86 (1997) (arguing that Ukrainians identify themselves as
rejecting Polish and Russian national identities); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, Ukraine Be-
tween East and West, in ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 1, 8 (Peter L.
Rudnytsky ed., 1987); Ivan L. Rudnytsky, The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological
Antecedents, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 186, 187, 197,
205 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (discussing Ukraine's 1918 declaration of independ-
ence). See generally The First Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada (1917)
(Ukr.), reprinted in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 382 (Taras
Hunczak ed., 1977) (asserting that the Ukrainian Assembly has the right to promul-
gate laws leading to order); The Second Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada
(1917) (Ukr.), reprinted in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 385,
385-86 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977).
Western ideals and values referred to throughout this document refer to the gen-
eral principles of human rights, limited government, and a civil society which em-
braces rule of law which are generally acknowledged in Western Europe and North
America. See Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, The Directory of the Ukrainian Na-
tional Republic, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 82, 94-95
(Taras Hunczak ed., 1977).
18 See SuBTELNY, supra note 1, at 355-79; John S. Reshetar, The Communist Party
of the Ukraine and Its Role in the Ukrainian Revolution, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-
1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 159, 159, 162, 180 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (stat-
ing that the Ukrainian Communist Party originally had little ethnic Ukrainian con-
tent and that Ukraine was oppressed by Russia which had little interest in Ukrainian
independence); Jaroslaw Pelenski, The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to
the "Kievan Inheritance," 1 HARV. UKRAINIAN STUD. 29 (1977) (stating that Russia
claims that Ukraine is part of Russia). See generally Alexander J. Motyl, The For-
eign Relations of the Ukrainian SSR, HARv. UKRAINIAN STUD., March 1982, at 62,
63 (1982) (arguing that Ukraine was not truly independent during Soviet rule); IVAN
L. RUDNYTSKY, The Role of Ukraine in Modern History, in ESSAYS IN MODERN
UKRAINIAN HISTORY 11 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987); IvAN L. RDNYTSKY, Ob-
servations on the Problem of "Historical" and "Non-historical" Nations, in ESSAYS
IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 37 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (discussing the
relationship among political independence, the existence of a politically conscious
representative upper class, and the completeness or incompleteness of nations).
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point in history was clearly pro-Western and opposite to the anti-
Western path that Russia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) chose. 19 Although the evolution of a rule of law and democ-
racy in Ukraine were halted by the defeat of the Ukrainian National
Republic after World War I, this evolution was reborn in the Soviet
thaw of 1960-1980.20
Ukraine's history also reveals a long standing tradition of protec-
tion of human rights and limitations on government power.21 As early
as 1710, the Ukrainian Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk (Orlyk Constitu-
19 See Ihor Kamenetsky, Hrushevskyi and the Central Rada, in THE UKRAINE,
1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 33, 57 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (arguing that
in 1917 the Rada adhered to democratic principles); Taras Hunzak, The Ukraine
Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVO-
LUTION 61, 69 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (stating that Hetman Skoropadsky pro-
claimed freedom of speech and assembly in 1918); Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Commu-
nist Take-Over of the Ukraine, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLU-
TION 104, 111 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (stating that the Communist forces prom-
ised democracy); Wolodymyr Stojko, Ukrainian Aspirations and the Russian Provi-
sional Government, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 4, 6 (Ta-
ras Hunczak ed. 1977); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, Trends in Ukrainian Political
Thought, in ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 91 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed.,
1987) [hereinafter RUDNYTSKY, Trends]; IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, The Political
Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissidents, in ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY
477, 479-82 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (discussing Ukraine's rejection of "na-
tional" communism and integral nationalism). Compare UHODA TA KONSTITUZIYA
PYLYPA ORLYKA [Constitution] art. 6, 7, (1710) (Ukr.) with KONSTITUZIYA
UKRAYNSKOYIE RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE (as amended through
Nov. 21, 1949) [Constitution] art. 105 (Ukr.), translated in AMERICAN RUSSIAN IN-
STITUTE, CONSTITUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (1950).
20 See W. Yevdokymov, Development of the Idea of a Law Responsive State During
Totalitarian Regime and the Transition of Society to Democracy, PRAVO UKRAINY:
IURYDYCHNYI ZHURNAL, July 1997, at 3, 3.
21 See UHODA TA KONSTITUZIYA PYLYPA ORLYKA art. 6, 7, (1710) (Ukr.); see gen-
erally 2 UKRAINE: A CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA 1-119 (Volodymyr Kubijovy6 ed.,
1971) (describing Ukrainian legal history). See generally Arthur E. Adams, The
Great Ukrainian Jacquerie, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION
247, 260, 262 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977); Frank Sysyn, Nester Makhno and the
Ukrainian Revolution, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 271,
280 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977); Oleh S. Fedyshyn, The Germans and the Union for
the Liberation of the Ukraine, 1914-1917 in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN
REVOLUTION 305, 322 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977); Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, The
Church and the Ukrainian Revolution: The Central Rada Period, in THE UKRAINE,
1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 220, 239 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (discuss-
ing calls made by Ukrainian church groups to the people urging them to resist Soviet
invasion).
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tion) included provisions granting fights to citizens and provisions
which limited the authority of the government.22 The Hetman,23 for
instance, could not use his position for personal revenge or violate the
Orlyk Constitution when it seemed expedient for him to do so.24
Rather, the Ukrainian government was as bound by the provisions of
the Orlyk Constitution as were the citizens. 25 More recently, Draho-
manov's (1884) draft Constitution provided extensive protection for
speech, and the press, and additionally prevented illegal searches al-
lowing limitations on these rights only in time of war. 6 The contrast
is stark between these early principles and the Ukrainian Constitution
under the USSR where, due to political and military reality, the gov-
ernment was not bound by any provisions which granted rights and
liberties to citizens due to political and military reality.27
The current 1997 Ukrainian Constitution seemingly attempts to
prevent Soviet-style governmental control and abuse of the rights of
citizens enumerated in the Constitution.28 One such abuse in the So-
viet system was rule by the Central Committee of the Communist
Party rather than the elected Supreme Soviet.29 In the Soviet system,
the government was controlled by the Communist Party structure
which mirrored the elected government structure.30 Article 37 of the
current 1997 Constitution specifically prohibits political party struc-
2 See UHODA TA KONsTrrUZIYA PYLYPA ORLYKA art. 6,7 (1710) (Ukr.).
23 Equivalent of an elected Prime Minister or President. See generally SUBTELNY,
supra note 1, at 110.
24 See UHODA TA KONSTrrUZIYA PYLYPA ORLYKA art. 6, 7 (1710) (Ukr.).
25 See id.
2 See Mykhailo Drahomanov, Draft Constitution for the Ukrainian Society in the
Free Union, in TowARDs AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF UKRAINE: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF UKRAINIAN THOUGHT FROM 1710 TO 1995, at 171, 172-73 (Ralph Lindheim &
George S.N. Luckyj eds., 1996) (stating that citizens had the right to resist illegal
government acts).
27 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 29.
28 See generally id.
29 See SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 386, 510-12; MOTYL, supra note 18, at 67 (stat-
ing that the Ukrainian Communist Party was an instrumentality of the Russian
Communist Party in 1917).
3 See BORIS A. TSEPOV, Protection and Promotion of Human Rights: Power Allo-
cation Among Central, Regional, and Local Governments in the Russian Federation,
in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE U.S.A. AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE
FORMER U.S.S.R. 410, 411 (James E. Hickey, Jr. & Alexej Ugrinsky eds., 1996).
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ture from mirroring the structure of the government. 31 The apparent
intent of this article is to prohibit any political party from forming its
own government inside the elected government of Ukraine. Thus, its
operation prohibits a Soviet-style government within Ukraine.
In the 1930s, Ukraine was subjected to illegal acts of the gov-
ernment of the USSR, most notably at Vinnytsia and during the engi-
neered terror-famine of 1932-1933.32 Vinnytsia, a city in central
Ukraine, was one of the cites where the NKVD conducted mass exe-
cutions and burials.33 The corpses interred at Vinnytsia were exhumed
by German forces during World War II and autopsies were performed
31 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II, art. 37 (1996) (Ukr.); Cf. Anatoly
Tkachuk, Cabinet Ministers'Analysis of the Current Situation in Ukraine After the
1994 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOP-
MENT PROJECT 1 (discussing the hybrid nature of the pre-constitutional and post-
Soviet Ukrainian government).
32 See German Government Report on Vinnytsia 1944, in THE TRAGEDY OF VIN-
NYTSIA MATERIALS ON STALIN'S POLICY OF EXTERMINATION IN UKRAINE DURING
THE GREAT PURGE, 1936-1938 91, 168-210 (Ihor Kamenetsky ed., 1989) (describing
those killed by the NKVD in Vinnytsia); Petro Dolyna, Famine as a Political
Weapon, in THE BLACK DEEDS OF THE KREMLIN: A WHITE BOOK 5, 120 (S. 0. Pid-
hainy et al. eds., 1955) (describing deaths from the engineered famine in Ukraine
1932-1933 at five to six million). See generally Ivan Dudynets, The Great Famine in
Ukraine in 1932-1933, in THE BLACK DEEDS OF THE KREMLIN: A WHITE BOOK 141,
141 (S. 0. Pidhainy et al. eds., 1955) (describing the famine and how it was con-
ducted); KONSTITUZIYA SoYuzu RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE
[Constitution] (1936) (U.S.S.R.), translated in ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR 77 (1981); Danylo Chaykovsky, Stepan Bandera, His
Life and Struggle, in MURDERED BY Moscow 36 (1962) (discussing Bandera's rise
as a leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Moscow's fifteen-year
mission to assassinate him); Dmytro Shtykalo, The Founder of the Revolutionary
Liberation Movement, in MURDERED BY MOSCOW 29 (1962) (discussing Evhen Ko-
novalets' role in the foundation of the Ukrainian Military Organization and the Or-
ganization of Ukrainian Nationalists and his murder at the hands of a Soviet agent);
Stepan Lenkavsky, Soviet Russian Political Murders Abroad and Attempts to Cam-
ouflage Them, in MURDERED BY MoScow 5 (1962). Cf. ANDREW WILSON, UKRAIN-
IAN NATIONALISM IN THE 1990s: A MINORITY FAITH 147-52 (1997) (discussing the
theme of national suffering in Ukrainian nationalism).
33 See generally THE TRAGEDY OF VINNYTSIA MATERIALS ON STALIN'S POLICY OF
EXTERMINATION IN UKRAINE DURING THE GREAT PURGE, 1936-1938, 210 (Ihor
Kamenetsky ed., 1989).
The NKVD is the descendant, administratively, of the Cheka and the forerunner
of the KGB. See CHRISTOPHER ANDREW & OLEG GORDIEVSKY, KGB: THE INSIDE
STORY, ix (1990). All these agencies are organs of state security of the former
USSR. See id; SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 365, 374, 420, 461, 479, 488-90.
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by international human fights groups.34 Many of the corpses were
found with court documents on theirRersons sentencing them to terms
of years in prison rather than death. This evidences the lack of rule
of law in the USSR as court decisions were ignored by governmental
agencies, most notoriously the NKVD.36
The implementation of the terror-famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933
further evidences the absence of a rule of law.37 The terror-famine was
an engineered famine in which five to nine million persons were
starved to death in an attempt to force collectivization upon Ukrainian
farmers.38 Such acts by the government were prohibited by the citi-
zens' rights provisions in the Constitutions of both the Ukrainian SSR
and the USSR of the time.39 As with Vinnytsia and other crimes of the
USSR's government, these provisions were simply ignored.40
34 See generally German Government Report on Vinnytsia 1944 in THE TRAGEDY
OF VINNYTSIA MATERIALS ON STALIN'S POLICY OF EXTERMINATION IN UKRAINE
DURING THE GREAT PURGE, 1936-1938, supra note 32, at 168-210.
31 See id. at 168-210 (describing the items found with the NKVD's victims).
36 See Anna M. Kvzmik, Rule of Law and Legal Reform in Ukraine: A Review of
the New Procuracy Law, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 611, 611 (1993) (discussing Soviet
legal theory and how laws were not followed or enforced due to political expedi-
ency).
37 See Dolyna, supra note 32, at 120 (describing deaths from the engineered famine
in Ukraine 1932-1933 at five to six million). Cf. ROBERT CONQUEST, THE HARVEST
OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE TERROR - FAMINE 301, 303, 306
(1986) (estimating 14.5 million dead in the famine and dekulakization, seven to nine
million in the famine alone). See generally Dudynets, supra note 32, at 141, 141-710
(describing the famine and how it was conducted). See also generally Kazuo Nakai,
Soviet Agricultural Policies in the Ukraine and the 1921-1922 Famine, HARV.
UKRAINIAN STUD., March 1982, at 43, 45 (1982) (arguing that the famine of 1921-
1922 was caused by Soviet collectivization).
38 See Dolyna, supra note 32, at 120 (describing deaths from the engineered famine
in Ukraine 1932-1933 at five to six million).
39 See KONSTITUZIYA UKRAYNSKOYIE RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUB-
LIKE art. 105 (as amended through Nov. 21, 1949) (Ukr.), translated in AMERICAN
RUSSIAN INSTITUTE, CONSTITUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
(1950); KONSTrrUZrYA SoYuzu RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE [Con-
stitution] ch. 11 (1924) (U.S.S.R.), translated in ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR 58, 59-60 (1981); KONSTrruziYA SoYuzu RADYN-
SKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE ch. X art. 125 (1936) (U.S.S.R.), translated
in ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A GUIDE TO
THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS 77, 156 (1981). But see ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A GUIDE TO THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS 282,
283 (1981) (stating that the Bill of Rights in the 1977 USSR Constitution was more
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L.
Russia has a historical lack of respect for courts and their judicial
decisions.41 Although a full discussion of such conduct is beyond the
scope of this Note, the incidents which are previously recounted here
clearly support the lack of the rule of law in the USSR.42 Soviet law
operated according to political expediency.43 In contrast, the 1997
Ukrainian Constitution prohibits such acts against the rule of law by
the government in Article 60 and establishes rule of law in Ukraine.'
Article 60, once again, shows the effect of history on Ukraine's cur-
rent Constitution and the intent of the framers to limit the power of
the sovereign (government of Ukraine).45
Political reprisals and mass murder which were common in the
USSR are prohibited by the current Constitution in Articles 27-29.46
The prohibition on such acts of the government evidences an intent to
stop any carry-over of the USSR's historical practices to the contem-
porary government of Ukraine.47
A portion of the political ideology of the USSR, namely social-
ism (rather than international communism), remains ingrained in
limited than most other communist constitutions and that the Stalin Constitution
enumerated even fewer rights). See generally KONSTITUZIYA SOYUZU RADYNSKOYIE
SOSIALISTICHNom RESPUBLIKE [Constitution] ch. VIII (1977) (U.S.S.R.), translated
in ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR 230, 246 (1981)
(outlining the national-state structure of the U.S.S.R.).
40 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 21-22 (1979) (stating that early Soviet Constitutions plainly rejected judicial
review opting for political control of constitutional interpretation; it was not until
1977 that Soviet Constitutions were amended to recognize constitutional suprem-
acy); TSEPOV, supra note 30, at 411 (arguing that the Soviet system ignored the very
notion of human rights and the rights enumerated in the USSR Constitutions and the
Republics' Constitutions were never implemented).
41 See ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL CON-
SCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 1985-1996, at 149 (1997) (stating
that President Yeltsin disbanded the Russian Constitutional Court for 18 months
after September 21, 1993).
42 See Kvzmik, supra note 36, at 611 (stating that socialist law differs from rule of
law in that it is not to limit government but rather to facilitate political ends).
41 See id. at 611.
44 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II, art. 60 (1996) (Ukr.).
41 Such intent to limit sovereign immunity is also demonstrated by the Constitu-
tional provisions which allow citizens of Ukraine to recover monetary damages from
the government when their rights are violated. See id. art. 56.
46 See id. art. 27-29.
47 See Futey, supra note 7, at 29.
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Ukraine and embodied in the Constitution.48 Social welfare rights in
the Constitution include: (1) the right to work; (2) the right to rest; (3)
the right to be provided for when disabled; (4) the right to housing;
(5) the right to an acceptable standard of living; (6) the right to protec-
tion of health and; (7) the right to education. 4 These are termed posi-
tive rights as they require the government to do something, rather than
prohibiting its action, which would consequently be termed negative
rights.50 These rights demonstrate the socialist past of Ukraine under
the USSR and socialism's current public appeal in Ukraine, once
again demonstrating the effect of history on Ukraine's Constitution.
51
Environmental disasters during the Soviet period, such as Cher-
nobyl,52 also have a current effect on Ukraine's Constitution. Envi-
ronmental protection is held to be a right in Article 50.53 Chernobyl
was a watershed event in Ukraine's political development in that
many Ukrainians began questioning Soviet rule after the catastrophe
and whether the central government of the USSR actually cared about
the plight of its citizens-specifically Ukrainians. 54 Environmental pro-
tection provisions in the Constitution evidence not only a limiting in-
tent on the government and on other citizens' activities but also a mis-
trust of the government.
55
Historically, Ukraine has been a pro-Western nation which has
favored citizens' rights and limitations on governmental powers.56
Ukraine's national identity is partially defined by opposition to Russia
48 See id. Ukraine's population was decimated by mass murders of the intelligent-
sia and the flight of the elites who were so endangered. See ZINOVIJA SLUZHYNSKA,
HUMAN RACE IN UKRAINE 100-02 (1995). Some have argued that the current popu-
lation of Ukraine has been reduced to, largely, those who need and support such
protection. See id. It is also argued that those who support capitalism and democra-
tization are mostly dead or in foreign lands leaving Ukraine without a democratic
intelligentsia to lead it into the future. See id.
49 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrtZiYA ch. II, arts. 43, 45-49, 53 (1996) (Ukr.).
"o See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
51 See M. Melnyk, Commentary on the New Constitution of Ukraine, SVOBODA,
Aug. 27, 1996, at 2.
52 See, e.g., ROMAN SOLCHANYK, UKRAINE: FROM CHERNOBYL' TO SOVEREIGNTY:
A COLLECTION OF INTERVIEWS xiii (1992).
53 See UKRAYNSKA KONsTrruzryA ch. II, art. 50 (1996) (Ukr.).
54 See id. art. 43, 45-49, 53; SOLCHANYK, supra note 52.
5 See SOLCHANYK, supra note 52, at xiii.
56 See UHODA TA KONSTrrTUZIYA PYLYPA ORLYKA art. 6, 7 (1710) (Ukr.); LAH
GREENFELD, NATIONALISM: FIvE ROADS TO MODERNITY 191-274 (1992).
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and is, as such, pro-Western. 57 In fact, Ukraine became anti-Russian
when Russia broke with its Westernization program during the Czarist
era, previous to which Ukrainians had been among the leading propo-
nents of Russian Westernization. 58 Russian national identity after the
Russian revolution is best summarized by Liah Greenfield:
'They fear not laws; right gives way to force, and justice lies conquered
beneath the aggressive sword.' The Scythians were the negation of
civilization, of all Rome stood for, the embodiment of the forces of
darkness .... Only in utter exasperation [about Russia's lack of na-
tional identity] could [the Russian intelligentsia of 1917] claim the
name of this savage tribe.
59
Ukraine, therefore, has a national identity which supports Western
thought, civil liberties, and limits on governmental authority.
60
Ukraine's pro-Western national identity is further indicated by
the similarity between many citizens' rights provisions in its Constitu-
tion and the provisions in the U.S. Constitution which limit govern-
mental power and provide rights for citizens. 61 The negative rights
provisions in Ukraine's Constitution which are based on its pro-
Western national identity, history, and historical animosity toward
Russia6U include: (1) the rights which are enumerated are not an ex-
57 See GREENFELD, supra note 56, at 191-274; Yevdokymov, supra note 20, at 3, 4
(stating that rule of law and human rights are growing in popularity in Ukraine).
58 See GREENFELD, supra note 56, at 191-274.
59 Id. at 273.
60 See generally Tkachuk, supra note 31 (describing the distribution of power in
post-independence, pre-Constitution Ukraine).
61 Compare UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II (1996) (Ukr.) with U.S. CONST.
amend. I-X. The superficial similarity in these provisions begins with the granting
of similar rights and ends at the point where the claw back provisions occur.
62 See JuRu BORYS, THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOVIETIZATION OF
UKRAINE 298, 321, 331 (1960). See generally IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, Soviet Ukraine
in Historical Perspective, in ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 463, 464-500
(Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, The Intellectual Origins of
Modern Ukraine, in ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 123 (Peter L. Rudnyt-
sky ed., 1987) (discussing the influences on Ukrainian intellectual development
prior to World War I); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, The First Ukrainian Political Program:
Mykhailo Drahomanov's "Introduction" to Hromada, in ESSAYS IN MODERN
UKRAINIAN HISTORY 225 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (critiquing Drahomanov's
theory of an all-Ukrainian democratic communalism); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, The
Ukrainian National Movement on the Eve of the First World War, in ESSAYS IN
MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 375, 386-87 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (discuss-
ing the Russification of Ukraine and the countervailing nationalist consciousness of
Ukrainians); George A. Brinkley, Jr., Allied Policy and French Intervention in the
[Vol. 31:169
UKRAINIAN CITIZENS' RIGHTS PROVISIONS
haustive list of citizens' rights; (2) citizens have the right to equal pro-
tection under the law; (3) the inviolability of one's home; (4) the right
to privacy in one's mail and correspondence; (5) the right to freedom
in one's personal life; (6) the right to freedom of movement within
Ukraine and to leave Ukraine; (7) the right to freedom of speech; (8)
the right to freedom of religion; (9) the right to freedom of associa-
tion; (10) the right to vote; (11) the right to assemble peacefully; (12)
the right to engage in entrepreneurship, own property, and protect
one's intellectual property; (13~) the right to strike; (14) the prohibition
on enacting retroactive laws. 6 The similarity between provisions in
Ukraine's Constitution and those in the U.S. Constitution as inter-
preted by the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrate an intent to regain
Ukraine's Western national identity and historically Western ideol-
ogy, as well as to set Ukraine apart from Russia in terms of national
identity and history, especially during the Soviet period. 64 Moreover,
the Constitution seeks to create a civil society which was thought to
be "capitalist subterfuge" during the Soviet period.65 Indeed, civil so-
ciety did not even exist in the pre-1989 USSR.66
Ukraine, 1917-1920, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 323
(Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (exploring the complex political and social context en-
countered by the Allies in their attempt to intervene in Russia during World War I);
Constantine Warvariv, America and the Ukrainian National Cause, 1917-1920, in
THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 352, 378 (Taras Hunczak ed.,
1977) (referring to the U.S. State Department's view that popular demand for greater
Ukrainian local autonomy existed there in 1919).
63 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZiYA ch. II, arts. 21, 22, 24, 30-36, 38, 39, 41,42,44,
58 (1996) (Ukr.).
54 See Futey, supra note 7, at 29; Ukraine Sets Course for the West, CURRENT Di-
GEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, May 22, 1996, at 26 (condensing and translating
Vladimir Skachko's original article appearing in SEVODNYA, Apr. 24, 1996, at 8);
Evhen I. Golovakha & Nataliya V. Panina, The Development of a Democratic Po-
litical Identity in Contemporary Ukrainian Political Culture, in NATIONALISM, ETH-
NIcrrY AND IDENTITY 403, 403 (Russell F. Farnen ed., 1994).
6 See Yevdokymov, supra note 20, at 3.
6 See MOTYL, supra note 16, at 60.
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I1. CONTEMPORARY PoLrTCAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE
CIrIZENS' RIGHTS PROvISIONS AND THE CLAW BACK PROVISIONS
67
The framers' intent is appropriately used by courts to interpret a
constitution.68 Ukraine, prior to the 1997 Constitution's adoption, ex-
perienced a proliferation of parties, perhaps in response to the end of
Soviet one-party rule, including the Socialist party, the Peasant's
party, the Green party, the Nationalist parties, and the Christian De-
mocrats.
69
The number of parties in post-independence Ukraine includes
over thirty-eight registered parties in 1996.70 Although the Worker's
Party and the National Democratic movements were key factors in
Ukraine's transformation up until independence, 71 four main groups of
parties are most influential today.72 These groups are the Communists
(which is the largest) and the Socialists (including the Peasant Party
and the Agrarian Parliamentary Faction), who compose the leftist par-
ties, the Ukrainian National Assembly and Congress of Ukrainian Na-
tionalists, who can be described as rightists, and the center-right Na-
67 The author considers it important, when considering Ukraine's contemporary
political environment, that Russia has recognized Ukraine, alleviating some of
Ukraine's fear of invasion and external interference. See Roman Szporluk, The Na-
tional Question, in AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: FROM EMPIRE TO NATIONS 84, 95
(Timothy J. Colton & Robert Legvold eds., 1992) (stating that President Yeltsin
recognized Ukrainian independence as early as November 1990).
68 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-29 (1816) (stat-
ing what the framers of the U.S. Constitution intended and basing the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the applicable U.S. Constitutional provisions on the
framer's intent).
69 See Anatolii Rusnachenko, The Workers' and National-Democratic Movements
in Contemporary Ukraine, J. UKRAINIAN STUD., Summer-Winter 1993, at 123, 123.
See Golovakha & Panina, supra note 64, at 411. See generally O.L. Barabash, Leg-
islative Process in Ukraine 1994, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 2-
3 (describing the Rada's legislative initiative in pre-Constitution Ukraine); Alek-
sandr Koretsky & Viktor Zamyatin, There is Now One Fewer 'Land of Soviets,'
KOMMERSANT-DAILY, June 9, 1996, at 1, condensed in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
POST-SOVIET PRESS, July 5, 1995, at 24 (describing the post-independence, pre-
Constitution government of Ukraine).
70 See Taras Kuzio, The Emergence of Ukraine: Part One, 268 CONTEMP. REV. 119,
123 (1996); Country Report: Ukraine, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY
REP., 1st Quarter 1997, at 13 [hereinafter Ukraine, 1st Quarter].
7' See generally Rusnachenko, supra note 69.
72 See Kuzio, supra note 70, at 123-25.
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tional Democrats. 73 The Rukh party - which was powerful during
Ukraine's independence movement - has a diminished role today.74
Although political parties have proliferated, apathy and mistrust
of parties and the government is common among Urainians.75 Rukh' s
platform of bringing Uraine into line with the U.N. Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights76 is popular with Ukrainians - who continue
to favor Western political ideas77. The main impediments to the citi-
zenry forcing democratization and libertarian reforms upon the gov-
ernment were, and continue to be, the lack of confidence in both the
president and parliament78 coupled with the fragmentation of political
parties.7 9
Ukrainians embraced independence by a vote of over ninety per-
cent80 and yet many never read the published drafts of the 1997 Con-
stitution.81  This created a political disagreement between Moroz
Oleksandr, the leader of the Socialist Party, and President Leonid Ku-
chma over how the Constitution should be ratified. 82 President Ku-
chma favored popular ratification while Moroz favored parliamentary
ratification, arguing that the people would ratify anything. 83 The dis-
pute came to a head when President Kuchma signed a decree fixing
September 25, 1997 as the date for a national referendum on the Con-
73 See id.
74 See Program of the Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine, in TO-
WARDS AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF UKRAINE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF UKRAINIAN
THOUGHT FROM 1710 TO 1995, at 341, 341 (Ralph Lindheim & George S.N. Luckyj
eds., 1996).
75 See Golovakha & Panina, supra note 64, at 403, 405, 409, 414.
76 See Program of the Popular Movement for the Restructuring of Ukraine, supra
note 74, at 346-48.
7 See Golovakha & Panina, supra note 64, at 403, 424.
78 See Viktor Zamyatin, Authorities Will Argue Until the People Intervene, KOM-
MERSANT-DAILY, May 18, 1996, at 4, condensed in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-
SovIET PRESS, June 12, 1996, at 21.
79 See Country Report: Ukraine, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REP.,
4th Quarter 1996, at 11-12 [hereinafter Ukraine, 4th Quarter].
so See TARAS Kuzio & ANDREW WILSON, UKRAINE: PERESTROIKA TO INDEPEND-
ENCE 1 (1994).
8' See Zamyatin, supra note 78, at 21.
82 See Ukraine, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Winter 1996, at 29, 30.
' See id.
1999]
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L.
stitution. 84 Despite the decree, the Verkhovna Rada (Rada),85 the
Ukrainian Parliament, adopted the Constitution two days after Ku-
chma signed the decree calling for a national referendum. 86 The Con-
stitution was passed in the Rada with virtually no support from the
Communists. 8 In fact, the Communists unsuccessfully attempted to
block the Constitution's passage entirely.88
The debates which led up to the Constitution's adoption in-
cluded all parties in some way, but the most important Constitutional
drafts were submitted by the Communist faction of the Rada, the Na-
tionalists, and the Christian Democrats. 89 Although the Communist
and Peasant's party initially withdrew from the Conciliation Commit-
tee which was officially drafting the Constitution - the Socialists par-
ticipated only as observers due to a dispute regarding whether the
Rada should be bicameral - these parties were lured back to the table
by President Kuchma's promise of a unicameral Rada.
90
The fall of the Soviet Union created an atmosphere which was
conducive to the growth of "new" parties or, more precisely, the
growth of parties other than the Communist party and its descendants
which all wished to have input in the drafting of the Constitution.
91
8 See Vladimir Skachko, Ukrainian President Calls Referendum on Constitution,
SEVODNYA, June 28, 1996, at 1, condensed in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET
PRESS, July 24, 1996, at 24.
85 The legislative branch of the Ukrainian government is composed of democrati-
cally elected representatives who are chosen on a local district basis. See Barabash,
supra note 69.
86 See id. at 25.
87 See id. at 25 (describing Communist support for the old Soviet Constitution
rather then the proposed Constitution).
88 See Country Report: Ukraine: ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REP.,
3rd Quarter 1996, at 11 [hereinafter Ukraine, 3rd Quarter].
89 See Visnyk, Comparative Characteristics of Various Drafts of the New Constitu-
tion of Ukraine Prepared by the Constitutional Commission and Political Parties,
1996 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1 (charting and distinguishing the
characteristics of drafts written by the different political parties and the Constitu-
tional Commissions).
90 See Ukraine, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring-Summer 1996, at 27, 28. Presumably
the parties which refused to participate without the promise of a unicameral Rada
felt that such organization would maximize the possibility that they would control
the Rada. See Zamyatin, supra note 78, at 21. They were probably persuaded by the
tradition of a unicameral legislature, or feared a bicameral legislature would lead to
federalization of Ukraine and a loss of independence. See id.
91 See KuzIo & WILSON, supra note 80, at 18-41.
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One of the notable parties which emerged after the fall of the USSR is92
the Green party. The Green party has its genesis in the Chernobyl
disaster and the other environmental catastrophes of the Soviet pe-
riod.93 As the name implies, the Green party's interests are centered
around environmental protection.94 The Green Party's impact in the
Constitutional drafting process can be seen in the environmental pro-
tection clause in the Constitution.95 The Nationalist parties, although
weakened by some seventy years of international communist rule, still
exist and are popular in western Ukraine. 96 These Nationalist parties
are not national socialists but rather democratic in their ideology.
97
Christian Democrats have also created a party.98 Indeed, Christianity,
although never truly exterminated in Ukraine, has experienced a popu-
lar re-birth since religious freedom was established.99-
One of the largest problems encountered during the drafting of
the Constitution was a lack of consensus. 100 When one compares the
three most important draft proposals of the Constitution (Nationalist,
Communist faction of the Rada, and Christian Democrat proposals)
with the current 1997 Constitution, it appears that the Constitution is
one of compromise. 1 1 Such deduction may lead to the conclusion that
items not chosen were intended to be excluded from the Constitution.
When one compares the various drafts of the Constitution pro-
posed by the Ukrainian political parties and the language adopted,
clear choices by the Rada are evident.102 Overall, the draft proposed
by the Communist faction of the Rada (which is similar - in major
92 See SOLCHANYK, supra note 52; Roman Szporluk, National Reawakening:
Ukraine and Belorussia, in THE SOviET EMPIRE: THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL AND
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS 75, 78, 90 (Uri Ra'Anan ed., 1990) (stating that Cherno-
byl stimulated Ukrainian nationalist movements).
93 See SOLCHANYK, supra note 52, at xix-xx.
94 See id.
95 See UKRAYN KA KONsTrruziyA ch. II, art. 50 (1996) (Ukr.).
96 See WILSON, supra note 32, at 152 (noting that Ukrainian liberation struggles
have served to mobilize nationalists in western Ukraine).
97 See id. at 148. See generally Rusnachenko, supra note 69 (discussing the rela-
tionship between the Workers' and National Democratic Movements in Ukraine).
98 See Visnyk, supra note 89.
99 See SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 193-94, 400-02, 519-20, 541.
10D See Judge Bohdan A. Futey, Ukraine's Draft Constitution Meets Political Real-
ity, E. EuR. CONST. REv. 14 (Winter 1993).
101 See Visnyk, supra note 89.
'02 See id.
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parts identical - to the USSR Constitution) has been rejected. 0 3 The
drafts proposed by the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the
Christian Democratic Party (which are substantially similar) were
adopted virtually verbatim.1°4 As the drafts of the parties which favor
personal liberty and democratic ideals were the basis of the Constitu-
tion, it is clear that their intent, even if not stated eloquently, should
be the basis of Constitutional interpretation. In short, the framers' in-
tent was democratic and favored individual freedom.
m-I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S ROLE IN INTERPRETING THECONSTITUTION 1 °5
Ukraine's Constitution purports to protect virtually all the rights
which the U.S. Constitution does by direct statement or judicial inter-
pretation.10 6 Guaranteed rights include the negative provisions which
prohibit the government from acting, such as freedom of speech, re-
ligion, assembly, personal affairs, movement, freedom to strike, own
property, protect one's intellectual property, conduct entrepreneurial
activity, vote, and the right to privacy in one's correspondence and
dwelling place. 10 7 The Constitution also prohibits the government
from subjecting a citizen to double jeopardy, retroactive laws, and
providing unequal protection under the law. 10 Moreover the Constitu-
tion states that the enumeration of rights is not exhaustive and may
not be degraded. 109
A. Procedural Issues Involved with Bringing a Case Before the Con-
stitutional Court
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine is the sole interpreter of the
Ukrainian Constitution" 0 and its decisions are binding upon the par-
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See generally, e.g., 'Visnyk Konstytutsiynoho Sudu Ukrainy' Bimonthly Sees the
Light, AMERICA, Nov. 1, 1997, at 11 (stating that Visnyk Konstytutsiynoho Sudu
Ukrainy is the bulletin of the Constitutional Court).
106 Compare UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. 11 (1996) (Ukr.) with U.S. CONST.
amend. I-X.
107 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. II, arts. 21, 22, 24, 30-36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44,
51, 52, 54, 58, 61-63 (1996) (Ukr.).
108 See id. at arts. 24, 58, 61.
" See id art. 22.
"0 There is some dispute as to whether all courts or just the Constitutional Court
may interpret the Constitution. See Analysis of the Draft Law on the Judicature for
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ties and throughout Ukraine prospectively.' The Constitutional
Court may declare statutory acts as well as presidential edicts uncon-
stitutional and thereby nullify their operation.112 Ukraine has created a
concentrated system of judicial review in which only one court is able
to interpret the Constitution. 113 The enabling legislation for the Con-
stitutional Court came into effect on October 16, 1996 and it began
accepting cases on January 1, 1997."1
The Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (Law
on the Constitutional Court) does not permit private citizens to file
appeals before the Constitutional Court. 15 A private citizen may,
Ukraine, A.B.A. CENT. AND E. EUR. L. INITIATIVE, June 20, 1997, 3, 8. Ivan Tym-
chenko, Chairman of the Constitutional Court (equivalent to U.S. Chief Justice),
stated that the Constitutional Court will interpret the Constitution alone and the Su-
preme Court of Ukraine will have to stay proceedings during the process. See Ro-
man Woronowycz, Ukraine's Court System: The Constitutional Court, UKRAINIAN
WKLY., Mar. 2, 1997, at 3.
"1 See Futey, supra note 8, at 15, 16, 17. The Constitutional Court's jurisdiction is
limited to interpreting the Constitution. See id. at 16. Courts of general jurisdiction,
of which the highest court is the Supreme Court of Ukraine, have jurisdiction over
all other matters. See id. The Crimean Constitution is part of Ukrainian law and
subject to the Constitution. See Law on Crimean Constitution is Approved, CURRENT
DIGEST OF THE POST-SOViET PRESS, Apr. 17, 1996, at 22 (condensing and translating
Vladimir Skachko, SEVODNYA, Mar. 23, 1996, at 4).
12 See Yurii S. Shemshuchenko, The "President" and State Authorities in Ukraine,
in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE U.S.A. AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE
FORMER U.S.S.R. 151, 154 (James E. Hickey, Jr. & Alexej Ugrinsky eds., 1996)
(stating that the president may not interfere with the Constitutional Court).
113 See ALLAN R. BREwER-CARIAs, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 185
(1989) (defining a concentrated system of judicial review). Ukraine may, however,
have a mixed system as the Ukrainian Supreme Court is empowered to interpret the
decisions of the Constitutional Court. See generally id. at 265-326; Law of Ukraine
on Statutory Legal Acts of Ukraine art. 133, 138 (1995) (Ukr.), translated in Law of
Ukraine on Statutory Legal Acts of Ukraine, 1995 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT 1 (stating that the Constitutional Court is "to determine the constitutional-
ity of explanatory acts" relating to the status of Ukrainian citizens).
114 See Futey, supra note 8, at 15, n.3; Constitutional Court Established, UKRAINIAN
LEGAL & ECON. BULL., Nov. 1996, at 5. The Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional
Court of Ukraine was drafted and passed by the Rada. See Futey, supra note 8, at
15. The law contains a number of unclear and repetitive provisions as well as ar-
guably inadequate protection of citizens' rights. See Analysis of the Draft Law on
the Judicature for Ukraine, supra note 110, at 3.
115 See Futey, supra note 8, at 18. The standing commissions of the Rada can apply
to the Constitutional Court for opinions. See Law of Ukraine on the Standing Com-
missions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, art. 14 (1995) (Ukr.), translated in The
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however, be able to bring a case before the Constitutional Court by
filing or defending an action in a court of general jurisdiction, in
which case the judge would be responsible for filing an appeal with
the Constitutional Court if issues requiring Constitutional interpreta-
tion were presented.1 16 For instance, if a criminal case involved an
issue of privacy rights (i.e. police search), the court of general juris-
diction would file an interlocutory appeal with the Constitutional
Court' 7 and the case would be halted until the constitutional issue
was resolved.
118
A citizen may also directly petition the Constitutional Court un-
der Article 42 of the Law on the Constitutional Court if that person's
rights are violated - or may be violated - by a law which is unconsti-
tutional. 119 This route is by petition, not appeal from a decision. Thus,
in essence, a citizen may file a petition in regard to a law which is
never enforced against that citizen. Due to the concentration of all
constitutional interpretive power in the Constitutional Court, the
Court has been burdened with an enormous case load with over 1,000
petitions filed and a number of appeals filed in the spring of 1997.120
The speed at which the Constitutional Court can decide these
cases is questionable. As a result, the length of time that must be allo-
cated for important decisions is unclear. 21 The courts of general ju-
Law of Ukraine on the Standing Commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
1995 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1.
116 See Futey, supra note 8, at 19 (citing The Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional
Court).
117 See Woronowycz, supra note 110, at 3.
18 See id. at 3.
'19 See Futey, supra note 8, at 21 (citing The Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional
Court).
120 See id. at 22.
121 Appeals are, basically, discretionary although it is unclear how much latitude the
Constitutional Court has to refuse cases over which it clearly has jurisdiction. See id.
at 21, 22. Discretionary means that the Constitutional Court has the power to refuse
cases not within its jurisdiction (which is limited to violations of the Constitution
and, especially relevant here, laws which violate citizens' rights under the Constitu-
tion) and possibly even cases within its jurisdiction. See id. In concluding that the
Constitutional Court has jurisdiction, it must conduct an interpretive act. One exam-
ple would be a petition for the violation of a citizen's right to freedom of speech,
where the Constitutional Court would have to determine that the law which was in
question was (at least arguably) unconstitutional prior to having jurisdiction. See
generally id. Such predetermination for jurisdiction should be avoided by finding
that the filing of an appeal or petition simply creates jurisdiction. The procedure laid
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risdiction have jurisdiction over "criminal behavior" which is de-
scribed as an illegal act of the state rather than an unconstitutional
law. 12
2
Additionally, the procedure for the appointment of Constitutional
Court judges raises another issue, as terms of appointment are for nine
years without possibility of re-appointment, rather than life tenure.
123
The judgeships will, presumably, come up for reappointment'24 con-
currently, leading to the natural question of whether or not judges are
being chosen with an eye toward particular outcomes of pending
cases. Judges on the Constitutional Court may also be tempted to de-
cide cases with an eye toward future political or employment aspira-
tions rather than strictly relying upon the law, which is particularly so,
in areas where the law is fuzzy, such as the claw back provisions. 
25
B. Interpreting the Constitution: Methods Used by Other Courts and
the Appropriate Method for Ukraine
The threshold question with which the Constitutional Court must
deal is the problem of interpreting a document which encodes social
goals as positive Constitutional rights. 126 Social and economic rights
reduce the legitimacy of the entire document as they are effectively
unenforceable, yet given preeminence next to rights which are in-
out by the law on the Constitutional Court seems to reject this possibility in that the
procedure for accepting a case is multileveled and requires the issue to be one re-
quiring Constitutional interpretation. See generally id.
122 See id. at 18 n.ll.
'2 See id. at 17.
124 See Futey, supra note 8, at 17. The Constitutional Court Judges were appointed
at the same time with all their terms limited to nine years, therefore, so long as a
significant number of the Judges do not die or retire while in office the Constitu-
tional Court will be virtually replaced in its entirety in nine years. See generally id.
'" See id. at 17.
12 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 28-30.
Social goals which are stated in the Constitution as positive rights of citizens
include: (1) the right to work; (2) the right to rest; (3) the right to be provided for
when disabled; (4) the right to housing; (5) the right to an acceptable standard of
living; (6) the right to protection of health; (7) the right to education; and (8) the
right to environmental protection. See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. II, arts. 43,
45-49, 50, 53 (1996) (Ukr.). See generally Josd Maria Morenilla Rodriguez & Jean-
Claude Soyer, Report on the Legislation of Ukraine, 16 HuM. RTS. L. J. 344, 348
(1995) (stating that three general areas of rights are granted: (1) civil and political;
(2) procedural and criminal; and (3) social and economic).
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tended to limit government action and are, hence, enforceable. 127 Al-
though there is some question as to whether the Constitution is en-
forceable in some parts - and whether this determination could erode
the effectiveness of other rights provisions - this Note will assume
that the Constitutional Court will enforce all of the Constitution's
provisions.
128
Constitutional interpretation, especially in the field of citizens'
rights will probably center around provisions which limit citizens'
rights. 129 As previously noted, the provisions which limit a Constitu-
tional right - in the interest of public order, morality, or the rights and
freedoms of others - are termed claw back provisions. 130 One right so
limited is the right to freedom of thought and speech:
Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and speech, and
to the free expression of his or her views and beliefs. Everyone has the
right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information by oral,
written or other means of his or her choice. The exercise of these
rights may be restricted by law in the interests of national security, ter-
ritorial indivisibility or public order, with the purpose of preventing
disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, the
reputation or rights of other persons, preventing the publication of in-
formation received confidentially, or supporting the authority and im-
partiality of justice. 131
These limitations are vague' 32 as the broad wording of the claw
backs gives the Rada much discretion to limit rights. 133 They may be
127 See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
128 See generally Svetlana N. Kravchenko, Federalism and Problems of Environ-
mental Protection in Sovereign Ukraine, in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE
U.S.A. AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE FORMER U.S.S.R.: POWER ALLOCATION
AMONG CENTRAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 290, 292-95 (James E.
Hickey, Jr. & Alexej Ugrinsky eds., 1996) (stating that it is the domain of the courts
to protect citizens' rights and the environment).
These social goals (or positive rights) would have been more appropriately
placed in the preamble of the Constitution. See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
'29 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30, 31 (examining claw-back provisions
concerning citizens' rights).
130 See id. at 30. Provisions which permit degradation of the granted right are also
termed "derogatory clauses." See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R. 259,
275, appeal dismissed, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.
131 UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II, art. 34 (1996) (Ukr.) (emphasis added).
132 See Serhiy Naboka, Freedom of Press and Information Still Under Threat in
Ukraine Part I, UKRAINIAN WKLY., Aug. 31, 1997, at 2 [hereinafter Naboka, Part I]
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used, in their broadest reading, to limit the right which they qualify to
the point of voiding that right.13 4 To avoid nullifying the rights
granted in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court must perform
some variant of a balancing test.135 In such a test, the Constitutional
Court must balance the interests of the state and the people's interests
in order to give full effect to all articles of the Constitution. 136 When a
test is not specified, the court must determine the appropriate test.
137
The court should consider the larger objectives of the Constitution in
constructing the test which include: (1) the historic origins of the
rights enshrined; and (2) the relationship between the articles in the
document.
13 8
The plain language of the Constitution may lead one to a bifur-
cated analysis of laws limiting rights within the meaning of the claw
back provisions.1 39 First, one must determine if the law was pursuing a
legitimate governmental interest within the meaning of the claw back,
such as national security, public safety, territorial indivisibility, or
(noting that eliminating false accusations against public officials and insults have
been held permissible state ends in regulating speech).
133 See BERNARD H. SiEGAN, DRAFrING A CONsTITUTION FOR A NATION OR REPUB-
LIC EMERGING INTO FREEDOM 34-36 (2nd ed. 1994) (arguing that the Constitution is
inconsistent with aspirations of freedom and abundance).
134 See Futey, supra note 7, at 30; Black, [1986] A.R. 259 at 275.
135 See Black, [1986] A.R. 259 at 275; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 444 (1934); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-29
(1816); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (balancing property rights
with the concept of liberty). See generally West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (balancing the interests between employer and employee).
136 See Germany v. Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-25 (1985); Austria v.
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1986); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n 290
U.S. at 442, 444; Martin, 14 U.S. at 328-29. See generally Lochner, 198 U.S. 45;
West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. 379 (balancing the interests between employer and
employee).
137 See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R. 259, 276, appeal dismissed,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.
138 See id. at 269 (quoting Regina v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 481,524).
139 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. H, arts. 34, 35, 36 (1996) (Ukr.). Such analy-
sis may be impractical as some articles of the current Ukrainian Constitution include
the purpose/interest distinction (e.g. article 34) while others simply state that the
right may be restricted in the interests of certain principles (e.g. articles 35, 36). See
id.
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health and morality of the population. 140 Second, the law's purpose
must be analyzed to determine if it comports with the purposes al-
lowed in the claw back; such as public safety, morality, and the rights
and freedoms of others. 141 Hence, though a bifurcated analysis is pos-
sible under the plain language of the Constitution, such analysis is
clearly inadequate to protect individual rights. Such analysis provides
no real limits to governmental power, for one can imagine no law of
the Soviet regime which would not pass this cursory scrutiny, all So-
viet laws were to pursue national security and public safety in the in-
terest of public safety and morality.142 Hence, a balancing test is more
appropriate.
In conducting this balancing test, the Constitutional Court should
weigh the rights of citizens more heavily than the interests of the
state. 143 Soviet history reveals a long-standing pattern of disregard for
human rights and rule of law. 144 The Constitution attempts to reverse
that trend. 145 Such constitutional intent to limit governmental power is
evident from the constitutional provisions which provide for monetary
damages against the government when one's rights are violated.
1 6
Soviet-style government and abuse of human rights are also shown to
be against the intent of the Constitution through constitutional prohi-
bitions on parties controlling the government and the enumeration of
140 See id. (describing permissible governmental interests in restricting freedom of
speech, freedom of religion and philosophy, and freedom of association as including
some or all of national security, territorial indivisibility, public order, morality of the
population, protecting the rights and freedoms of other citizens, or health of the
population).
141 See id. (stating that such purposes include preventing disturbances or crimes,
protecting the health of the population, protecting the reputation or rights of other
persons, protecting confidential information, or protecting impartial justice).
142 See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (expanding permissible
police searches of an automobile under a reasonableness standard); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that a U.S. citizen has no privacy in-
terest in garbage placed at the curb for collection).
143 See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R. 259, 288, 298, appeal dis-
missed, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (quoting Regina v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 3 W.W.R.
481,524).
14 See SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 413-21, 478, 500-03.
145 See Futey, supra note 7, at 29; Law of Ukraine on Statutory Legal Acts of
Ukraine art. 4 (1995) (Ukr.), translated in Law of Ukraine on Statutory Legal Acts of
Ukraine, 1995 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1 (stating that the Constitu-
tion has the highest legal effect and ordinary laws must conform to it).
146 See Futey, supra note 7, at 34.
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human rights as protected citizens' rights.147 Hence, due to historical
precedent and the drafters' intent to avoid future abuses, the claw
back provisions should be construed narrowly against the govern-
ment. 48
Politics and the economy mandate a narrow reading of the claw
back provisions against the government. Politically, the draft of the
Constitution with broader claw back provisions proposed by the
Communist faction of the Rada was rejected for the narrower provi-
sions in the Nationalist and Christian Democrat draft proposals.14 The
rejection of Soviet-style government which was proposed by the
Communist faction of the Rada' 50 shows an intent not to follow its
traditions of state control. Furthermore, the adoption of proposals by
parties which do not favor extensive government controls on citizens'
lives shows an intent to grant citizens broad, meaningful rights.
Hence, the claw back provisions should be construed narrowly to ive
full effect to the political intent of the drafters of the Constitution. 1I
Ukraine's current economic situation does not provide a valid
reason for construing rights provisions in the government's favor.
Ukraine's economy is improving and government intrusion has
proven to be ineffective and actually harmful in the past - as shown
by the fall of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet economy. 152
Ukraine's transition to a market economy requires not only economic,
147 See id. at 29; A. Lytvynenko, The Law and the Culture: Theory and Practice,
PRAVO UKRAEINY: EHURYDYCHNYAI EZIHURNAL, June 1997, at 92 (arguing that So-
viet law was to accomplish a political agenda, but that present law should safeguard
culture and the values of the community); UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II, art. 37
(1996) (Ukr.). See generally Mykola Ryabchuk, Democracy and the So-Called
"Party of Power" in Ukraine, 3 POL. THOUGHT (1994) at 154 (discussing the role of
the post-communist nomenklatura in Ukraine).
148 See discussion infra Sections I., H. The inclusion of the claw back provision in
the Constitution may have been due to an intent to copy the European Convention
on Human Rights, due to political necessity, or both.
149 See Visnyk, supra note 89.
0 See id.
's' See discussion infra Sections II, IV.B. See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30-
31 (concerning clawback provisions as related to citizens' constitutional rights).
152 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30; Kuzio & WILSON, supra note 80, at 39;
Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11; Country Profile: Ukraine, ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY PROFILE, 1996-1997 [hereinafter Ukraine, 1996-
1997]; Country Report: Ukraine, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REP.,
2nd Quarter 1997 [hereinafter Ukraine, 2nd Quarter]; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supra
note 79; Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87.
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but also personal, freedom in order to flourish. 153 Ukraine's economy,
therefore, not only supports a broad reading of citizens' rights and a
narrow reading of the claw back provisions, but depends on such in-
terpretation for its success.1
54
The question remains as to how the Constitutional Court might
arrive at an interpretation. I propose that when a right is granted but
limited by public order, health, morality, the rights and freedoms of
others, or the action of law (or all of these), the limit should be strictly
construed. The appropriate test is formulated by requiring absolute
governmental necessity to facilitate a clear government interest linked
with clear support by the plain language of the claw back provision of
the government's asserted objective, as well as a narrow tailoring of
the means to the legitimate ends enumerated in the claw back. Public
order must be interpreted narrowly to avoid the excesses of the Soviet
period when it was used to restrict the rights of those who disagreed
with the government. 155 A narrow reading of the public order excep-
tion on a given right would force the government to show an immi-
nent danger which is sufficiently dangerous to the state (for example,
armed insurrection, rather than a peaceful demonstration).
When taken together with other claw back terms, which may be
interpreted as a whole, public order may be interpreted to require dan-
ger to health, morality, or the rights and freedoms of others. The
rights and freedoms of others must also be construed narrowly so that
no more restrictions are placed on the activities of citizens than the
government. The claw backs must also be interpreted not to apply
when rights are specifically granted to individuals. Health, when con-
strued narrowly, requires an imminent danger of death or grievous
bodily harm to other persons. Such restriction is reasonable when con-
strued narrowly and applied to extreme cases (for example, screaming
"fire" in a crowded theater as a limit on freedom of speech).
Probably the most amorphous concept is morality. Strictly speak-
ing, the criminal nature of all crimes is a moral choice; for example
murder is a moral interpretation and morality determines when it is
illegal (such as in war) or permissible (such as in the case of self-
defense). A strict reading of morality would limit its application to
circumstances requiring a moral choice to make an act criminal, in
essence limiting morality exceptions to those instances which are his-
torically and virtually uniformly acknowledged by current western
153 See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
'-' See discussion infra Section IV. A,B; Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
155 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 29 (stating that the intent of the Constitu-
tional drafters was to avoid Soviet-style rule).
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thought as being immoral. When strictly construed the claw back pro-
visions have the potential for innocuous action and need not negate
the rights which they qualify.
156
"Established by law" or "envisaged by law" are other problematic
terms in the Constitutional rights grants. 157 In its broadest reading,
simple laws which do not have the legal force of a constitution and are
not enacted by similar procedures requiring a su er-majority in the
Rada could serve to overrule the Constitution. 15It is illogical for
simple laws to be able to override a Constitution which purports to be
the supreme law of Ukraine. 159 Future laws should, therefore, be con-
strued to violate the Constitution when they go beyond regulatory
functions and begin to erode the right itself. The proper way to change
Constitutional law is through the amendment process, not by the less
stringent process of enacting legislation. 1
60
Although the proceeding proposal appears to be the most appro-
priate interpretive test for Ukraine's unique position and history,
161
national and supra-national courts have articulated other tests. One
156 Cf. Tatyana Ivzhenko & Roman Stoyanov, Ukraine Could Get a Very Good Con-
stitution, NEzAVIsIMAYA GAZETA, Dec. 7, 1995, at 1, condensed in CURRENT DIGEST
OF THE PosT-SOviET PRESS, Jan. 3, 1996, at 24, 24 (arguing that the claw backs are
insignificant and will not harshly limit the right with which they are associated).
157 See UKRAYNsKA KoNsTrruzrYA ch. II, arts. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 (1996) (Ukr.).
158 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
159 See Law of Ukraine on Statutory Legal Acts of Ukraine art. 4 (1995) (Ukr.),
translated in Law of Ukriane on Statutory Legal Acts of Ukraine, 1995 PARLIAMEN-
TARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1.
16 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. II, art. 57 (1996) (Ukr.) (requiring that notice
be given of new laws by a method "established by law" - without such notice the
law is not in force).
161 The Constitution was adopted by the Rada rather than by a popular vote. See
Skachko, supra note 84, at 24 (describing the Rada's marathon - about 25 hours -
cession which adopted the Constitution). The Rada clearly has greater bargaining
power, sophistication, and the ability to write a clear Constitution (reducing reliance
by citizens who act within what they believe to be their rights) - in short, the Consti-
tution could be interpreted as an adhesion contract. That interpretation would lead
to interpreting the Constitution against the government whenever there is an ambi-
guity and the citizen's legal theory is reasonable. See, e.g., Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 651 F.2d 838, 839 (2nd Cir. 1981); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
161 A.2d 69, 76, 94-95 (N.J. 1960); see also, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975) (holding that the inevitable result
of enforcing all provisions of an adhesion contract would be an abdication of judi-
cial responsibility).
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claw back provision interpretive method is a four part test. 162 This
method is used by the European Court of Human Rights to interpret
the claw back provisions in the European Convention on Human
Rights (the Convention). 163 The Convention tracks the wording of the
Ukrainian Constitution with one major difference. 164 The Convention
limits the operation of the claw backs to instances "necessary in a de-
mocratic society" while the Ukrainian Constitution omits this lan-
guage.1 65 One can imply such language in the Ukrainian Constitution
due to its overall objectives which appear to be a democratic civil so-
ciety. 16
6
This interpretive method first determines if there is an interfer-
ence with an enumerated right by a public authority.167 Second, the
basis of the intrusion is ascertained. 168 If there is a basis in domestic
law for the intrusion, the analysis continues - if there is no basis in
domestic law, the intrusion is illegal. 169 The next phase of the test in-
volves the interpretation of the claw back provision - if the purpose of
the interference with the right enumerated is covered by the claw back
(i.e. public order), the process continues. If the purpose of the intru-
sion is to do away with the enumerated right, it is illegal. 170 The intru-
sion into the protected right is then subjected to a "pressing social
need" standard (not "useful, reasonable, desirable, or indispensa-
ble").17 1 The basis of this standard is that intrusion into rights should
not be allowed unless it is "necessary" in a "democratic society.' 172
162 See Germany v. Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-25 (1985).
163 See id.
164 Compare UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. II, art. 35 (1996) (Ukr.) with European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 212, 230.
'65 Compare UKRAYNSKA KONSTrruzIYA ch. II, art. 35 (1996) (Ukr.) with Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230.
'66 See Rodriguez & Soyer, supra note 126, at 349, 358-60 (arguing that claw back
provisions must be minimal and conform with the theory of democratic society).
'67 See Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21.
'68 See id.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 23.
7' Id. at 25.
172 Id. at 23. See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R. 259, 288, 298, ap-
peal dismissed, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (quoting Regina v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 3
W.W.R. 481, 524).
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Moreover, the intrusion into a constitutionally protected right must be
"proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" by the government
agency.173 Further, the aim must be given by the governmental agency
and be "relevant and sufficient." 174
Other courts use a tripartite test.175 The first part is the determina-
tion of whether the intrusion into the enumerated right is prescribed
by law. 176 The second part is to determine what the objective of the
intrusion is, whether it is legitimate, and whether there is a relation-
ship between the intrusion into the right and the legitimate objective
as enumerated in the claw back.177 If the limitation passes the first two
parts of the test, it must be necessary in a democratic society or, more
precisely, the limitation must aid free society more than the right be-
ing limited. 178 Moreover, the right and the limitation of the right must
be weighed based on their social utility and importance in a free soci-
ety. 179 This test also requires that no less intrusive means exist to pur-
sue the legitimate government interest.1
80
Due to the intent of the Constitution to change the Soviet system
of government which did not respect the rights of citizens as protected
in the Soviet Constitutions, the provisions which guarantee rights to
citizens must be construed in a manner which is most favorable to
those rights guaranteed.181 Further, one of these tests must be adopted
due to the plain language of the Constitution. Article 1 states that
Ukraine is a democratic and law-based state. 182 Article 3 recognizes
"[t]he human being, his or her life and health, honor and dignity, in-
violability and security . . . as the highest social value" and that
"[h]uman rights and freedoms and their guarantees determine the es-
173 Germany v. Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1985).
174 Id.
175 See Austria v. Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1986); Black, [1986]
A.R. at 259.
176 See Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34; Black, [1986] A.R. at 285.
'77 See Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34; see generally Black, [1986] A.R. at
287 (quoting Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia A.I.R. 1960 S.C.
633, 640 that a limitation based on public order requires a nexus with public order
which is not hypothetical or too remote in causal chain).
178 See Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34; Black, [1986] A.R. at 285.
171 See Black, [1986] A.R. at 285.
180 See id.
18 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 29-31.
182 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrruzryA ch. I, art. 1 (1996) (Ukr.).
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sence and orientation of the activity of the state." 183 Moreover, the
rights granted are "not exhaustive," "shall not be abolished," and
"shall not be diminished." 184 Beyond the interpretive techniques out-
lined above, the Constitutional Court may go beyond the Constitution
to find natural human rights as the rights enumerated in the Constitu-
tion are stated to be not exhaustive. 5 In any event, if Ukraine is to
continue the development of its pro-Western national identity, the
rights of its citizens must be emphasized.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FUTURE INTERPRETATION OF THE CLAW
BACK PROVISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO UKRAINE'S FUTURE
COURSE OF ACTION
A. The Current Economic Situation in Ukraine and the Effect it may
have on Constitutional Interpretation
Outside pressures may effect the interpretation of a constitution -
paramount in these is the economic situation in the nation. 186 The eco-
nomic situation in a nation will affect politics and legal enactments as
well as, potentially, Constitutional Court rulings. 187 In Ukraine's Con-
stitutional Court, such pressure may be especially severe on Justices
who are not appointed for life and, hence, may seek to protect their
183 Id. art. 3.
'84 Id. art. 22.
'85 See id. (stating that the rights enumerated in the Constitution are not exhaustive).
Such natural rights may be found in the body of Western thought and are substan-
tially similar to the rights which are guaranteed in the Constitution if the claw back
provisions are construed narrowly.
186 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that one does
have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution) with
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that one does not
have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution).
187 Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (holding that one does have a fundamental
right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution) with West Coast Hotel Co.,
300 U.S. 379 (holding that one does not have a fundamental right to liberty of con-
tract under the U.S. Constitution). See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R.
259, 278-79, appeal dismissed, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (arguing that the change in U.S.
Constitutional interpretation from Lochner to West Coast Hotel was due to a change
in the idea of freedom in the United States because of the economic situation).
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future legal and political careers when interpreting the Constitution.
188
Further, the economy is currently Ukraine's greatest problem.
1 89
The current economic situation in Ukraine is improving. 190 The
rates of increase of inflation and unemployment are falling and are
predicted to continue decreasing, moving from a decrease in the rate
of increase to an actual decrease in the rates of inflation and unem-
ployment. 191 Personal income appears to be improving and is pre-
dicted to begin increasing. 192 In general, the Ukrainian economy ap-
pears to be improving, although it is still poor when compared with
the industrial and post-industrial economies of Western Europe and
America. 93
188 See UKRAYNSKA KoNSTrrUziYA ch. XII, art. 148 (1996) (Ukr.).
189 See Victor P. Perebenessyuk, The Potentialfor Conflict in Ukraine, PERSP. CON-
TEMP. UKR., July-Aug. 1995, at 1, 2.
190 See Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11 (describing Ukraine's economic
situation and related factors). See generally Ukraine, 1996-1997, supra note 152
(describing Ukraine's economy from 1996-97); Ukraine, 2nd Quarter, supra note
152; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supra note 79; Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87, at
14-15 (describing the economic reorganization of cabinet members aimed at stimu-
lating the economy); Guidelines for the Plan of Economic and Social Development
and the State Budget of Ukraine for the Year 1994, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVEL-
OPMENT PROJECT 1-9 (describing the government's plan to regulate the economy and
foster economic growth) [hereinafter Guidelines for the Plan of Development].
191 See Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11. See generally Ukraine, 1996-
1997, supra note 152 (describing Ukraine's economy from 1996-97); Ukraine, 2nd
Quarter, supra note 152; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supra note 79 (describing Ukraine's
economic situation and related factors); Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87, at 14-
15 (describing the economic reorganization of cabinet members aimed at stimulating
the economy).
192 See Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11. See generally Ukraine, 1996-
1997, supra note 152 (describing Ukraine's economy from 1996-97); Ukraine, 2nd
Quarter, supra note 152; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supra note 79 (describing Ukraine's
economic situation and related factors); Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87, at 14-
15 (describing the economic reorganization of cabinet members aimed at stimulating
the economy).
193 See Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11. See generally Ukraine, 1996-
1997, supra note 152 (describing Ukraine's economy from 1996-97); Ukraine, 2nd
Quarter, supra note 152; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supra note 79 (describing Ukraine's
economic situation and related factors); Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87, at 14-
15 (describing the economic reorganization of cabinet members aimed at stimulating
the economy).
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While Ukraine's economy shows many positive signs, a full re-
covery may be distant.194 Ukraine is, however, moving toward a
Western economy as the shadow economy shrinks. 195 Ukraine has the
potential for a strong economy due to its well trained workforce and
excellent natural resources. 196 Moreover, Ukraine is demographically
a Western nation with low rates of mortality and natural increase.197
Although the legal framework for economic development is incom-
plete, 9  the main continuing problem is the industrial complex
Ukraine inherited from the USSR at independence as it is "out-dated,
energy intensive. .. and heavily polluting."
99
Perhaps the greatest economic pitfall in Ukraine's future is the
energy crisis it faces.200 Ukraine currently must rely on Russia for
much of its fuel.20' Ukraine continues to attempt to reduce its depend-
ence on Russian oil and gasoline.202 There remains the potential for
Russia to use Ukrainian dependence on Russian fuel to coerce politi-
cal choices in Ukraine.2 03 As a lack of fuel can virtually shut down the
Ukrainian economy, the card which Russia holds is a high one.204 It
remains to be seen if Ukraine will reduce the potential for such Rus-
194 See Ukraine, 2nd Quarter, supra note 152, at 9.
195 See Dr. Serhii Teryokhin, The Current Situation in Ukraine and Scenarios for the
Future, PERSP. CONTEMP. UKR., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 2, 9-10.
196 See UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 98-100 (Ann Lencyk
Pawliczko ed., 1994).
'97 See Ralph S. Clem, Demographic Trends in Ukraine in the Late Twentieth Cen-
tury, in THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES 47,
47-49 (I.S. Koropeckyj ed., 1992) (describing Ukraine's low rate of mortality, low
birth rate and population growth rate).
198 See On Privatization in Ukraine, UKRAINIAN LEGAL & ECON. BULL., July 1997,
at 19, 21.
199 Ukraine, 1996-1997, supra note 152, at 13.
m See Oles M. Smolansky, Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor, 47
EUR.-AsiA STUD. 67, 67-68 (1995).
201 See id.; Conrad Fritsch, Practical Experience in Restructuring Collective Agri-
cultural Enterprises in Ukraine, UKRAINIAN LEGAL & ECON. BULL., July 1997, at 14
(arguing that privatization of agricultural and other governmental holdings is also a
serious problem).
202 See Smolansky, supra note 200, at 74-75, 85.
203 See id.
204 See id. at 85; Oleh Havrylyshyn, Ukraine's Economic Crisis and Western Finan-
cial Assistance, 3 POL. THOUGHT (1994) at 161, 168.
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sian coercion by finding other sources of energy20 5 or if Russia will
continue to use this dependence for political coercion.
206
Economically, the positive rights in the Constitution will be very
expensive in a limited state budget. 20 7 It is the duty of the Chamber of
Accounting to pay for what is mandated in the Constitution. 20 8 Hence,
there is a legal mandate and an easily identifiable government agency
to sue if the social rights are not fully implemented. Further, paying
for the entitlements may be simply impossible, even under court or-
der, as in 1996 alone the government was in arrears by 1.3 billion dol-
lars in payments to its employees.20 9
If the Ukrainian economy experiences serious down turns or col-
lapse, the Constitutional Court will be under considerable political
pressure to allow significant government intrusion in all aspects of the
economy and citizens' lives. Politically, an economic crisis would
tend to make the Soviet system appear more apetizing in spite of all
its trappings of political and social repression." ' Hence an improving
if not robust economy will be more conducive to reliable constitu-
tional interpretation and political stability.
212
20 See Havrylyshyn, supra note 204, at 161-68.
206 Russia has threatened to cut off oil to Ukraine in the past. See Smolansky, supra
note 200, at 74-75, 85.
2(" See Decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the Implementation of the
Ukrainian Law "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1994" (1994) (Ukr.), translated
in Decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the Implementation of the Ukrain-
ian Law "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1994, " 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVEL-
OPMENT PROJECT 1 (outlining the process for implementing the state budget) [here-
inafter On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1994]; Law of Ukraine on the State
Budget of Ukraine for 1994 (1994) (Ukr.), translated in Law of Ukraine on the State
Budget of Ukraine for 1994, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1.
2 See Law of Ukraine on the Chamber of Accounting of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine art. 2, 36 (1996) (Ukr.), translated in Law of Ukraine on the Chamber of
Accounting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1996 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOP-
MENT PROJECT 1.
2D9 See Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87, at 18.
210 See generally RUDNYTsKY, Trends, supra note 19 (discussing the populist, con-
servative, communist, and nationalist trends which lie latent in Ukrainian political
ideology); MOTYL, supra note 16; SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 510-37 (discussing
attempts to reform the Soviet regime and Ukraine's uncertain future).
211 See generally MOTYL, supra note 16; SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 510-37 (dis-
cussing economic conditions and political attitudes in Ukraine).
212 See JOHN E. TEDSTROM, UKRAINIAN REFORMS AND WESTERN ASSISTANCE:
STRUGGLING TOGETHER TO STAY THE COURSE (1996).
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B. Political Dangers to the Citizens' Rights Granting Provisions In-
cluding Foreign Intervention
Ukraine must overcome a legacy of massive political and eco-
nomic corruption as well as colonialism and the lack of civil soci-
ety. 1 Ukraine faces several problems in overcoming these problems
including: (1) the "party of power" namely the nomertdatura; 14 (2)
Russian interference;s and (3) Ukraine's internal political situa-
tion.
2 16
Ukraine continues to be dominated by former Communists. 2 17 In
fact, politics in Ukraine are dominated by a 9/36 formula in which out
of a total population of 36 million, 9 million residents of Western
Ukraine support democracy while 27 million Eastern Ukrainians, who
actually decide the nation's course of action, favor a more Soviet-
style government.2 18 The Ukrainian Constitution shows this pro-Soviet
bent in that the social guarantees in the Constitution were copied from
the Soviet Constitution.
2 19
One of the greatest dangers faced by Ukraine is adverse foreign
influence, namely from Russia.220 Russia considers Ukraine a security
threat as an independent nation.2 21 Ukraine is considered virtually a
213 See Oksana Grabowicz, The Legacy of Colonialism and Communism, PERSP.
CONTEMP. UKR., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 1, 1, 10.
214 See Ryabchuk, supra note 147, at 154, 159 (stating that the "party of power" (the
Communist party which controlled Ukraine until recently) and the nomenklatura
(the old party apparatus) must be appeased to insure reforms are successful).
215 See Konstiantyn Morozov, Ukrainian Independence in the International Context,
PERSP. CONTEMP. UKR., Jan.-Feb. 1995 (visited Sept. 18, 1997) <http://www.sabre.
org/huri/publications/perspv2nl .html>.
216 See Ihor Lysyj, Former President Kravchuk Addresses Twin Cities Meetings,
UKRAINIAN WKLY., Sept. 14, 1997, at 3.
217 See generally Barabash, supra note 69 (describing the democratization process in
Ukraine).
218 See Lysyj, supra note 216, at 3.
219 See Melnyk, supra note 51.
m See Morozov, supra note 215.
221 See John W.R. Lepingwell, The Russian Military and Security Policy in the
"Near Abroad," SURVIvAL, Autumn 1994, at 70, 70-74, 79-80; Francis Fukuyama,
The Ambiguity of "National Interest," in RETHINKING RussIA's NATIONAL INTER-
ESTS 10, 18, 22 (Stephen Sestanovich ed., 1994) (stating that it is within Russia's
national interest to protect Russian minorities in Ukraine and that the G-7 world
would support Russia in doing so); Sergei B. Stankevich, Toward a New "National
Idea," in RETHINKING RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS 24 (Stephen Sestanovich ed.,
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province of Russia by Russian historians and culture.222 In short, Rus-
sia views Ukraine as a nation which it can "work on" and as a nation
which is not truly independent.223 Thus, Russian national identity is
the USSR2 24 and as such, Ukraine is an integral part of Russian na-
tional identity.225 Past Russian influence on Ukraine has been disas-
trous for Ukrainian national identity and has resulted in personal trag-
edy for the Ukrainian populace.226 There is no reason to believe that
future Russian domination will be more tolerable or productive.227
Notwithstanding future fears and choices as to how the citizens'
rights provisions in the Constitution will be interpreted due to external
forces and the party of power, current issues have arisen as to consti-
tutional interpretation and enforcement.228 One such issue is the free-
dom of the press provision in the Constitution.229 Prior to the adoption
of the Constitution, freedom of the press was in doubt.23 ° One such
instance was in regard to those who spoke in a manner which would
tend to be divisive to the various ethnic groups in Ukraine.231
In August 1992, President Kravchuk issued a decree stating that
those who used freedom of speech to split the population of Ukraine
along ethnic lines would be expelled from Ukraine.2 32 The danger
continues today in that most popular television stations are controlled
by the executive branch of the government as are one-quarter of the
1994) (arguing that Russia's national interest includes protecting ethnic Russians in
the "near abroad").
222 See SOLCHANYK, supra note 52, at 128.
223 See Arkady Moshes, The Crisis in Ukrainian and Russian Policy, Moscow
NEws, Aug. 8-14, 1996, at 5.
2 See Roman Solchanyk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy, 9 POST-
SOVIET AFF. 337, 339, 341-42 (1993).
See id. at 339.
22 See generally SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 403-24, 453; SLUZHYNSKA, supra note
48, at 100-02 (arguing that those who favor democracy have been systematically
killed, depleting Ukraine's gene pool).
227 See Solchanyk, supra note 52, at 19, 20, 128; Grabowicz, supra note 213, at 8,
10.
2m See Naboka, Part I, supra note 132; Serhiy Naboka, Freedom of Press and In-
formation Still Under Threat in Ukraine, UKRAINIAN WKLY., Sept. 7, 1997, at 14
[hereinafter Naboka, Part I1].
229 See Naboka, Part 1, supra note 132; Naboka, Part 11, supra note 228, at 14.
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5,500 publications in Ukraine.233 State control of instruments of mass
media may be unconstitutional due to Article 42 which prohibits the
wrongful use of monopolies.234 Another constitutional question is
whether the state can tax publications so as to control them, which
may be prohibited by Article 92.235 Further, writers need licenses to
sell their work, which may lead to censorship, 6 and many members
of the press have been murdered after printing articles about govern-
ment corruption and theft.2 37 It remains to be seen how these issues
will be resolved but, if such state control of the press is allowed, the
Constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech appears to be in jeop-
ardy.238
The rule of law is also jeopardized by President Kuchma's appar-
ent dislike of the Constitution. 2 If political leaders and, thereby, the
government itself does not respect or follow the Constitution, earlier
USSR patterns of simply ignoring the law may reoccur. It is of utmost
importance, if the rule of law is to prevail, that the Constitution and
the decisions of the Constitutional Court be followed no matter how
unpopular or harmful to personal political careers.
Political infighting as well as fragmented political parties also
continue to plague Ukraine.240 The Rada has adhered to Western prin-
ciples and rejected Communist proposed Constitutional amendments
233 See Naboka, Part I, supra note 132; Naboka, Part II, supra note 228, at 14 (stat-
ing that the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political study believes that the eco-
nomic advantages government owned media have over private media sources vio-
lates the prohibition on the wrongful use of monopolies and taxation in Articles 42
and 92 of the Constitution).
2m See Naboka, Part I, supra note 132; Naboka, Part II, supra note 228, at 2, 14
(stating that the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political study believes that the
economic advantages government owned media have over private media sources
violates the prohibition on the wrongful use of monopolies and taxation in Articles
42 and 92 of the Constitution).
235 See Naboka, Part 11, supra note 228, at 14; Harvard Symposium Regarding:
"Freedom of Speech," UKRAINIAN WKLY., Aug. 24, 1997, at 8 (stating that a license
is required to sell publications).
236 See Harvard Symposium Regarding: "Freedom of Speech," supra note 235, at
16.
237 See Mykola Svitukha, Unpunished Crimes, SVOBODA, Sept. 23, 1997, at 2.
238 See Naboka, Part I, supra note 132; Naboka, Part II, supra note 228.
239 See S. Holovatey Criticizes the Organs of the Government, SVOBODA, Sept. 25,
1997, at 1 (stating that Holovatey commented that President Kuchma asked him to
sabotage the passage of the Constitution).
m1o See Melnyk, supra note 51.
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which would have limited the Constitutional Court's power and trans-
fer its interpretive power to the Rada.241 The Communist Party, how-
ever, continues to wage war on these democratic forces by insinuating
that the democratic forces are anti-Constitution because the social
rights in the Constitution are not being enforced (due to a lack of
funds). 242 Political reprisals also continue and may even involve the
fling of criminal charges and the denial of medical care while in
jail. A 3 Further, the Rada began impeachmentproceedings against
President Kuchma for vetoing a bill three times21 which may indicate
cracks opening in the rule of law.
The recent elections to the Rada may determine how the interpre-
tation of the Constitution will unfold.245 On August 28-29, 1997, the
Rada, in special session, did not pass proposed constitutional amend-
ments which were mainly proposed by the left.246 As the elections to
the Rada, in the spring of 1998, created a Socialist/Communist major-
ity, it is possible that the Constitution will be significantly
amended.247 This may include giving power back to local Radas which
are mostly leftist, thereby diluting presidential power.
248
In fact, some predict continuing Socialist/Communist control of
the Rada.249 If democratic forces retain control (whether or not they
call themselves Communists or Socialists), then the discussion as to
how the Constitution should be interpreted will continue to be criti-
241 See Marta Kolomayets, Verkhovna Rada Fails to Pass Election Law, Constitu-
tionalAmendments, UKRAINIAN WKLY., Sept. 7, 1997, at 1.
242 See, e.g., Ukraine, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Winter 1997, at 31, 31-32.
243 See Vladimir Skachko, Trial of a Defender of Deceived Investors, SEVODNYA,
Dec. 8, 1995, at 7, excerpted in CURRENT DIGEST OF POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 3,
1996, at 25 (discussing the ordeal of Leopold Taburgansky).
244 See Roman Woronowycz, Parliament Committee Acts on Kuchma Impeachment,
UKRAINIAN WKLY., Sept. 14, 1997, at 2.
245 See Lysyj, supra note 216, at 3.
2 See Kolomayets, supra note 241, at 1.
247 See id; Lysyj, supra note 216; Ukraine's Dangerous Decline, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
14, 1998, at Al.
ms See Anatoliy Tkachuk, Noted on the Structure of Government in Ukraine in Light
of the Draft Law on the Local Radas, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
1-3.
249 See Lysyj, supra note 216 (arguing that western Ukraine democrats are outnum-
bered by central and eastern Ukrainian voters who favor a more leftist government).
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cal. ° If not, Constitutional interpretation may be degraded to the
point of irrelevance.
C. Western Aid: Why it is Needed
The Ukraine's land area is the largest in Europe (aside from Rus-
sia which extends into Asia) and its population is the fifth largest, yet
is virtually unknown throughout the world.25 1 It is clearly in the stra-
tegic and economic interest of the nations of Europe and America to
aid Ukraine in its democratization process. 2 Economic aid is neces-
sary to help create the political stability needed for democratization.253
After seventy years of Soviet rule, Ukraine is also in dire need of po-
litical and legal aid in terms of theory and practice in a democratic
society. 4 Ukraine is also in danger from the former Soviet elites in
Russia who may prefer empire to the self-determination of nations. 5
Lawyers, legal associations, and libraries in democratic societies
could be of much aid in providing information.256 Democratic nations
can also assist Ukraine by providing continuing aid and information to
Ukrainian government agencies.25 Lawyers and those with legal ex-
pertise in the areas of interpretation of citizens' rights provisions may
also be of aid in defining legal terminology in Ukraine and, thereby,
make the provisions of the Constitution more effective.258 Ukraine is
0 See Clem, supra note 197 (discussing the political and demographic tragedies in
Ukraine's past).
25 See MOTYL, supra note 16, at 1, 4.
252 See id.
253 See TEDSTROM, supra note 212, at 5; Roman Szporluk, Nation Building in
Ukraine: Problems and Prospects, in THE SUCCESSOR STATES TO THE USSR 173,
180 (John W. Blaney ed., 1995).
2-4 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
255 See Szporluk, supra note 253, at 179.
256 See Bohdan Peter Rekshynskyj, Legal News by the Ukrainian Legal Foundation:
The "Ukrainian Center for Human Rights" Program (visited Sept. 18, 1997)
<http://news.std.com/sabre/UFPWWW Etc/LawULF/LN9502.html> (stating that
foreign aid should include texts for higher education, instruction to educate judges,
aiding in publication and dissemination of texts, and aiding Ukraine to comply with
international legal standards).
27 See COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS: Focus ON SERIOUS CHALLENGES FACING UKRAINE
(1994) (discussing the applicability of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act to bolstering
Ukrainian democratization).
258 See generally Bohdan Peter Rekshynskyj, Legal News by the Ukrainian Legal
Foundation: Counteracting Constitutional Chaos (visited Sept. 18, 1997)
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in need of immediate aid in terms of legal education and theory,
hence, Western aid should not be conditioned upon its actions on
other issues such as its budget deficit.259 The main goal of all foreign
assistance should be to allow Ukraine to maintain its independence
long enough to finish the development of its national identity and ful-
fill its democratic destiny.
If Ukraine is allowed to develop freely and continues to move
toward a democratic society and a rule of law, the future of the rights
of its citizens seem bright. However, Russian domination or interfer-
ence will, most likely, destroy the advances Ukraine has made and
drag Ukraine back into the abysmal legal vacuity of Russia's past (and
potentially future) national identity.
D. The Appropriate Interpretive Method for Ukraine and its Future
Use
The current Ukrainian Constitution does make great strides to-
ward a democratic society.260 It provides for rights of citizens and
states honest limitations which, when strictly construed, mirror the
limitations on citizens rights which the U.S. Supreme Court has rec-
ognized and which may prevent the government from simply ignoring
the rights of citizens as occurred in the Soviet period. To some degree
clarity is also a positive point in the Constitution in that limits on citi-
zens' fights are expressed - other factors which are not mentioned
probably cannot be legitimately used to limit rights.
On the other hand, the claw back provisions which qualify the
rights which are guaranteed have the potential to limit the rights they
qualify to the point of ineffectiveness."261 Furthermore, the inability to
enforce economic and social rights which are guaranteed places into
question the effectiveness of the entire document.262 These economic
and social rights are theoretically and practically unenforceable
against the government.263 Moreover, these rights may be simply too
expensive for the Ukrainian Government to provide in the current
<http://news.std.com/sabre/UFPWWWEtc/Law/ULF/LN9505.html>; Rekshynskyj,
supra note 256 (arguing that standardization of Ukrainian legal terminology is
needed).
2S9 See TEDSTROM, supra note 212, at 5.
26 See Futey, supra note 7, at 34.
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economic climate.2 64 Furthermore, if some constitutional positive
rights are not followed, it is possible that the negative restrictions on
government action may be equally ignored. Further, it is obvious that
the inclusion of positive rights in a manner other than goals in a pre-
amble was unwise due to Ukraine's unique history and current eco-
nomic difficulties.265
Ukraine faces serious challenges in enforcing the Constitution's
citizens' rights provisions without letting them be swallowed up by
the claw backs. If it is to succeed, Ukraine must stay independent, as
"democracy and empire are incompatible. 266 It must defeat internal
tendencies to return to Soviet-style rule or simply amend the Constitu-
tion when it conflicts with an illegitimate governmental goal.267 It
must rise above its history of assassination of her national leaders by
foreign powers and Russification. -68 Further, it must reconcile the
ethnic divisions within its society269 and the ethnic crisis in Crimea. 270
Finally, Ukraine's news media must break the Soviet mold of control-
264 See Guidelines for the Plan of Development, supra note 190, at 2-3 (describing
how to estimate the cost of economic aid to citizens); Law of Ukraine on the State
Budget of Ukraine for 1994 (1994) (Ukr.), translated in Law of Ukraine on the
State Budget of Ukraine for 1994, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1;
On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1994, supra note 207 (outlining the process for
implementing the state budget).
20 See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
266 Roman Szporluk, Statehood and Nation Building in Post-Soviet Space, in THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EURASIA, VOLUME 2: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ETHNIC-
ITY IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 3, 16 (Roman Szporluk ed., 1994).
267 See M. Melnyk, About Two Important Projects Concerning the Law, SVOBODA,
Sept. 26, 1997, at 2.
m See Oleksander Rudenko-Desniak, Ukrainians in Russia, PERSP. CONTEMP.
UKR., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 1, 5, 6 (excerpting a speech delivered Nov. 16, 1994);
Lepingwell, supra note 221, at 70, 79-8 1.
269 See Boris Sergeevich Krylov, Concept of Federalism in Light of the Rights of
Nations to Self-Determination, in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE U.S.A. AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE FORMER U.S.S.R.: POWER ALLOCATIONS AMONG CEN-
TRAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 415, 415-16 (James E. Hickey, Jr. &
Alexej Ugrinsky eds., 1996) (describing ethnographic policies in Ukraine and Rus-
sia).
270 See Ian Bremmer, The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine, 46
EUR.-AsiA STUD. 261, 280-81 (1994) (describing Kiev and Lviv as successfully in-
tegrating Russian minorities while Crimea has remained problematic).
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ling public opinion through symbols and yellow journalism and begin
to operate as an independent check on the government.
2 7 1
Ukraine must overcome these obstacles in steps, first establishing
a state, then followed by rule of law, civil society, a market economy,
and democracy.272 Ukraine has made great strides down this path.
Russia is not currently a military threat.273 Ethnic division has been
combated by a "zero option" of citizenship, which gives citizenship to
all those citizens of the USSR who were permanent residents of
Ukraine on the date of its independence. 274 Hence, Ukraine has chosen
not to define itself as an ethnic state,275 which has served it well in
combating ethnic infighting.276 Ukraine has also compiled a good re-
cord on human rights, expounding: (1) a liberal ethnic policy which
is deferential to ethnic minorities; 27 and (2) a path independent from
Russia and toward the Council of Europe's norms for civil rights and
environmental protection.279 In fact, in investigating Ukraine's appli-
cation to join the Council of Europe, the recommendation for admit-
tance was largely based on Ukraine's favorable human rights re-
cord.280
271 See Natalia Kostenko et al, Ukrainian Mass Media and Freedom of Information,
4 POL. THOUGHT (1994) at 148, 148, 155.
272 See MOTYL, supra note 16, at 68-70; George Sch6pflin, Postcommunism: The
Problems of Democratic Construction, DABDALUS, Summer 1994, at 127, 131 (stat-
ing that rule of law is necessary for political and economic stability).
273 See Brian D. Taylor, The Challenges of Ukrainian Statehood, PERSP. CONTEMP.
UKR., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 5, 5.
274 See Parliament Passes Law on Citizenship, AMERICA, Mar. 7, 1997, at 11.
275 See Roman Szporluk, Reflections on Ukraine After 1994: The Dilemmas of Na-
tionhood, HARRIMAN REV., Mar.-May 1994, at 1, 1.
276 See Ian Bremmer, Russians in Ukraine, PERSP. CONTEMP. UKR., Sept.-Oct. 1995,
at 1, 3, 7 (arguing that Russians have generally chosen to integrate politically and
ethnically and support Ukrainian political thought).
277 See Taras Kuzio, The Emergence of Ukraine: Part Two, 268 CONTEMP. REV.
182, 189 (1996).
278 See Susan Stewart, Ukraine's Policy Toward its Ethnic Minorities, RFE/RL REs.
REP., Sept. 10, 1993, at 55, 55-57.
279 See Ukraine Sets Course for the West, supra note 64, at 26 (stating that return to
the USSR is impossible as the Confederation of Independent States did not work).
28 See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Opinion No. 190 on the
Application by Ukraine for Membership of the Council of Europe, reprinted in 16
HuM. RTS. L. J. 373, 373 (1995).
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To continue down the path Ukraine has chosen, and to fully join
the Western family of nations, the Constitutional Court must choose
one of the interpretive models I have expounded in this Note. A fail-
ure to do so will inevitably lead to greater governmental intrusion in
what the Constitution describes as protected rights.281 Governmental
control is not the answer.
28' See generally Aivars Slucis, Russian Imperialism Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
1997, at A11 (discussing after-effects of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe).
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